The /api/providers/github/setup callback performed privileged writes (persisting
App client_secret/webhook_secret/private_key, re-pointing installations) with no
session check, deriving the write target (organizationId/userId on gh_init,
githubId on gh_setup) from the attacker-controlled state parameter. An
unauthenticated request, or a member with no gitProviders permission, could plant
or re-point a provider in any organization.
Require a valid session, gate on the gitProviders permission (same guard the tRPC
github router uses), derive the create target from the session, and verify the
gh_setup provider belongs to the caller's organization.
createInsertSchema inferred scheduleType as a broadened union (drizzle-zod 0.5.1),
so passing input.scheduleType into assertHostScheduleAccess failed typecheck on a
cold build. Refine the insert schema's scheduleType to a plain z.enum and type the
helper param as the schedule enum.
Host-level schedules (server / dokploy-server) run their script as root on the
host. The owner/admin gate only ran in the no-service branch, so a member could
attach an accessible applicationId to a dokploy-server schedule and skip it,
gaining root via schedule.runManually.
Extract assertHostScheduleAccess into the schedule service and call it before
the service-access branch in create/update/delete/runManually so the host-level
authorization always applies.
- application general 'Open Terminal' now passes serviceId (applicationId).
- The docker/terminal DockerTerminalModal now forwards serviceId to its Terminal.
- compose container rows thread serviceId to their terminal + logs modals.
This lets a member with service access (but without the docker permission) open
the terminal / read logs of their own service's containers from every service
view, matching the backend service-first authorization.
When a container is opened from a service page (serviceId present), gate on
service access alone — matching application.readLogs — instead of requiring the
docker permission first. This unblocks a member who has the service but not the
canAccessToDocker permission (or the server it runs on) from reading its logs /
opening its terminal. Generic Docker-overview ops (no serviceId) still require
docker permission + server access.
- Reorder canAccessDockerOverWss: docker permission -> service access (if
serviceId) -> server access, so the service grant is the primary signal.
- Pass serviceId from the service log views (application + postgres/mysql/mariadb/
mongo/redis/libsql + compose) so container logs opened from a service page are
gated by checkServiceAccess, matching the terminal path.
Completes GHSA-qf9j service-level dimension: when a container terminal/logs/stats
is opened from a service page, the frontend now passes serviceId, and the wss
authorizer calls checkServiceAccess so a member restricted to specific services
cannot reach another service's containers. Generic Docker-overview opens have no
serviceId and keep the docker-permission + server-access gate.
Verified against the local WebSocket: a member (docker:read=false) is rejected
with close code 4003; owner is allowed.
Closes GHSA-qf9j-c9p4-r4xp
The /terminal, /docker-container-terminal, /docker-container-logs and
/docker-stats WebSocket handlers only checked session + organization, so any
authenticated member could open a root shell / read logs of any container, and
the local (serverId=local) branch reached a root SSH shell on the control-plane
host.
Adds an authorization layer (server/wss/authorize.ts):
- container ops (terminal/logs/stats): require the docker permission (owner/admin
or a member granted canAccessToDocker); for a remote server, require the server
be accessible to the caller.
- host/server terminal: the local host root terminal is restricted to owner/admin;
a remote server terminal is gated on server access.
Closes GHSA-c68r-7wg9-p7v2, GHSA-899j-cjwp-v4gw, GHSA-7r6p-v9gw-pwc8, GHSA-qf9j-c9p4-r4xp
- cluster.removeWorker: input.nodeId (z.string(), no regex) was interpolated raw
into 'docker node update/rm ${nodeId}' — now shell-quoted.
- swarm image upload (getRegistryCommands): registryTag / imageName were
interpolated raw into 'docker tag'/'docker push' and an echo. registryTag is
built from username and imagePrefix, which have no schema regex, so it was
injectable — now shell-quoted. (The docker login already used
safeDockerLoginCommand, so credentials were already safe.)
- gpu-setup: nodeId (derived from 'docker info', not user input) escaped as
defense-in-depth.
Closes GHSA-4mfc-grxw-6858, GHSA-hfwh-69ch-gv47, GHSA-prwq-2mcm-mvhr
- composePath / appName are now passed through shell-quote in createCommand,
getCreateEnvFileCommand and services/compose.ts deploy commands, instead of
being interpolated raw into 'docker compose'/'docker stack' shell commands.
- compose.command: sanitizeCommand was cosmetic (trim + strip quotes). It now
rejects shell control characters (; & | ` $ () {} <> newline), which a normal
docker compose CLI line never contains, blocking breakout into host commands.
Closes GHSA-8r5w-vqjr-8c44, GHSA-5xv2-7f8w-9j5c, GHSA-qh6h-669j-77rw
The backup and restore command builders interpolated database name / user /
password directly into a 'docker exec ... {bash,sh} -c "..."' string executed
via execAsync / execAsyncRemote. Because the values sit inside the outer shell's
double quotes, a simple quote() is insufficient: the outer shell expands $(),
backticks and $VAR before the inner quoting applies (double-nested shell).
Values are now passed to the container as environment variables (docker exec -e
VAR=<shell-quoted>) and referenced as "$VAR" inside a single-quoted inner
script, so they never enter the inner command text and cannot break out of
either shell layer. The rest of each command (pg_dump/mysqldump/etc., flags,
| gzip) is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-qc73-mp78-4833, GHSA-qf8x-98cv-92qh, GHSA-ww4j-wjrr-rq8v, GHSA-7m3w-rm5f-h4fr, GHSA-f7mp-9jfp-mjrr
The deploy functions for postgres/mysql/mariadb/mongo/redis/libsql interpolated
the user-settable dockerImage field unquoted into 'docker pull ${dockerImage}'
executed via execAsyncRemote (SSH) on the remote server path. Now passed through
shell-quote. The local path already used pullImage() (execFile-based) and is
unaffected.
Closes GHSA-6jrh-8qmg-jj3p
- dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker) -> docker pull / echo
- dockerContextPath (docker-file builder) -> cd
- publishDirectory (nixpacks builder) -> docker cp source/dest paths
These fields were interpolated unescaped into shell commands run via execAsync /
execAsyncRemote during deployment. All are now passed through shell-quote.
Registry credentials already went through safeDockerLoginCommand (unchanged).
Closes GHSA-g9cg-4mmj-mh7p, GHSA-jxxj-gmpx-h5rj, GHSA-qjrc-g63x-qhp9, GHSA-98j8-6vjr-c3xw
Simpler and consistent with the existing registry column exclusion in the same
query: drop the secret columns from the nested github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket
relations via columns:{ ...: false } instead of a post-fetch redaction helper.
Server-side clone paths re-fetch providers by id (find{Github,Gitlab,...}ById),
so deployments are unaffected. Column names are validated at compile time by
drizzle's typed columns config.
Closes GHSA-hg9j-j5mc-phf5, GHSA-wx75-vxph-2m2f
findApplicationById eagerly loads the github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket relations
(needed server-side to clone) including OAuth tokens, the GitHub App private key
and webhook secret. application.one returned them to the client, exposing them to
any member with service:read even when hasGitProviderAccess was false.
Adds redactApplicationGitSecrets() in the application service (blanks the secret
columns, immutably) and applies it to application.one. No client feature reads
these secrets (verified in the frontend); server-side clone paths use
findApplicationById directly, so behaviour is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-hg9j-j5mc-phf5, GHSA-wx75-vxph-2m2f
swarm.getNodes/getNodeInfo/getNodeApps/getAppInfos accepted a caller-supplied
serverId and ran remote Docker Swarm reads against it with no organization
check, exposing another tenant's swarm topology cross-org (getContainerStats
already had the check; the others did not). getNodeInfo additionally
interpolated nodeId unescaped into 'docker node inspect ${nodeId}'.
Adds an org-ownership assertion to the four unscoped handlers and passes nodeId
through shell-quote in getNodeInfo.
Closes GHSA-jj6h-388v-9rwm
findServerById eagerly loads the sshKey relation (needed for server-side SSH
operations) including the plaintext privateKey. server.one and server.remove
returned that record to the client, exposing the private key to any member
with server:read regardless of canAccessToSSHKeys.
Adds redactServerSshKey() in the server service and applies it to the server.one
and server.remove responses. No client feature consumes the private key (the SSH
key management UI uses the dedicated sshKey router), and server-side callers keep
using findServerById directly, so behaviour is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-w9cp-jqfw-4xj9
The getBranches inputs type the provider id as optional, so only fetch and
authorize when an id is actually present; the underlying getBranches already
returns [] when no id is supplied.
The .one / getRepositories / getBranches / testConnection handlers for
github, gitlab, gitea and bitbucket resolved a provider by bare id under
protectedProcedure and returned the full row (OAuth tokens, app private
keys, webhook secrets) with no organization or entitlement check, letting
any authenticated user read another org's git-provider credentials (IDOR).
Adds assertGitProviderAccess() in the git-provider service (rejects cross-org
with NOT_FOUND and non-entitled same-org with FORBIDDEN, reusing the existing
getAccessibleGitProviderIds entitlement logic) and calls it in every read
handler before returning secret-bearing data.
Closes GHSA-66r5-5m5f-57vg
User-controlled git fields (customGitUrl, branch names, repo owner/name,
gitlab namespace, SSH hostname) were interpolated unescaped into git clone /
ssh-keyscan shell commands run via execAsync / execAsyncRemote, allowing
authenticated OS command injection. All such values are now passed through
shell-quote before interpolation (defense at the sink, covering every code
path including the compose branch bypass).
Closes GHSA-qxcw-cx35-2hrw, GHSA-hrfh-82jj-3q46, GHSA-6693-xv3f-69px,
GHSA-qwwm-hc7m-7xp9, GHSA-grrj-6xrh-j6vp, GHSA-x2p2-qq8g-2mqq,
GHSA-cg8g-x23v-5fw8
