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test(security): fix type error in shell-quote op assertion

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This commit is contained in:
Mauricio Siu
2026-07-19 20:47:42 -06:00
parent cf35eae73f
commit 97cd7d1009
1 changed files with 15 additions and 20 deletions
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35
apps/dokploy/__test__/git-provider/git-clone-command-injection.test.ts
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@@ -54,19 +54,23 @@ describe("cloneGitRepository command (customGitUrl path)", () => {
type: "application",
});
// A malicious substring, once escaped, must survive parsing as inert literal
// text and never as an executable command/operator. `parse()` turns command
// substitution and control operators into { op } objects, so we assert the
// injected marker only ever shows up inside a plain string token.
const markerLeaksAsShellSyntax = (command: string, marker: string) => {
const tokens = parse(command);
return tokens.some(
(t) => typeof t !== "string" && JSON.stringify(t).includes(marker),
);
};
it("does not let a malicious customGitUrl inject shell operators", async () => {
const command = await buildClone(
"https://github.com/o/r.git$(touch /tmp/pwned)",
"main",
);
const tokens = parse(command);
// No token in the generated command may be a shell operator carrying the
// injected substitution (e.g. { op: "$(" }). The payload must appear only
// as inert literal text.
const hasCommandSubstitution = tokens.some(
(t) => typeof t === "object" && "op" in t && t.op === "$(",
);
expect(hasCommandSubstitution).toBe(false);
expect(markerLeaksAsShellSyntax(command, "touch")).toBe(false);
expect(command).toContain("git clone");
});
@@ -75,18 +79,9 @@ describe("cloneGitRepository command (customGitUrl path)", () => {
"https://github.com/o/r.git",
"main; touch /tmp/pwned",
);
const tokens = parse(command);
const hasSemicolonOperator = tokens.some(
(t) => typeof t === "object" && "op" in t && t.op === ";",
);
// The clone builder itself joins statements with ";", so at least the
// structural ones exist — but the branch payload's ";" must NOT surface
// as an extra operator that would run `touch`.
const semicolonOps = tokens.filter(
(t) => typeof t === "object" && "op" in t && t.op === ";",
).length;
expect(hasSemicolonOperator).toBe(true);
// The branch is a single quoted token, so it contributes no new ";" op.
// The branch is a single quoted token, so its ";" contributes no extra
// operator and `touch` never becomes a runnable statement.
expect(markerLeaksAsShellSyntax(command, "touch")).toBe(false);
expect(command).not.toContain("touch /tmp/pwned;");
});
});