Updated the SSO configuration to trust verified emails and modified user creation to set emailVerified to true by default. This enhances security and ensures that user email verification is properly handled.
The verify-totp handler checked for the error code
INVALID_TWO_FACTOR_AUTHENTICATION, which no longer exists in
better-auth 1.6.23 (the two-factor plugin now returns INVALID_CODE).
As a result, entering a wrong TOTP code fell through to the generic
catch and showed "Error verifying 2FA code / Unknown error" instead of
a clear "Invalid verification code" message.
Match the current better-auth error code so the specific, actionable
message is shown.
The organization switcher's DropdownMenuContent inherited its width from
the collapsed trigger (~40px) via the base primitive's
w-(--radix-dropdown-menu-trigger-width), clamping the menu to the
min-w-32 (128px) floor. This cut off the org name and action buttons in
icon mode.
Set an explicit w-64 so the menu fits its content regardless of the
trigger width, matching the pattern already used by the notification
dropdown in the same file.
Fixes#4840
The remote (execAsyncRemote) path built `echo ${password} | docker ${args.join(" ")}`
with the password, registryUrl and username interpolated unescaped, so a password
like `pw; whoami` ran arbitrary commands as root on the target server. Reuse
safeDockerLoginCommand (already used by create/update), which shell-escapes each
field and feeds the password via --password-stdin. The local argv+stdin path was
already safe.
server.remove deleted a server (and its deployment rows) by caller-supplied
serverId without checking it belongs to the active organization, unlike server.one
and server.update. An owner/admin of org A could delete org B's server registration.
Resolve and compare the server's organizationId before the active-services guard,
so cross-org callers are rejected without leaking existence.
writeTraefikConfigRemote piped the stringified YAML through echo '...' where a
single quote in any label/host/serviceName broke out (GHSA-478p). Encode it as
base64 like the other writers, and quote() every configPath used in remote
rm/cat/redirect commands (including the input.path-derived ones).
quote() the user-derived paths that reach the shell in file mounts
(mount.ts, docker getCreateFileCommand), patch repo read (repoPath/filePath),
certificate create/remove (certificatePath), and the remote scheduled command
(containerId/shellType/command/logPath), so $(), backticks and traversal in
these fields can no longer inject commands.
Add VOLUME_NAME_REGEX (Docker volume-name format) and enforce it on volumeName in
create/update/runManually — a legit volume name never contains shell metacharacters,
so this blocks injection across every docker run/rm/rclone sink at once. Escape the
user-supplied backupFileName and the mount volumeName in database rebuild with quote().
Wrap S3 credential flags (getS3Credentials + destination.testConnection), the
listBackupFiles search path, and every restore backupPath/backupFile with
shell-quote's quote() so $(), backticks, quotes and spaces in destination
fields or backupFile can no longer break out of the rclone shell commands.
Use shell-quote's quote([...]) directly at each git-provider clone call site
instead of the one-line shellWord wrapper, and remove the now-unused helper.
Behavior is identical (quote([String(v ?? '')])).
The /api/providers/github/setup callback performed privileged writes (persisting
App client_secret/webhook_secret/private_key, re-pointing installations) with no
session check, deriving the write target (organizationId/userId on gh_init,
githubId on gh_setup) from the attacker-controlled state parameter. An
unauthenticated request, or a member with no gitProviders permission, could plant
or re-point a provider in any organization.
Require a valid session, gate on the gitProviders permission (same guard the tRPC
github router uses), derive the create target from the session, and verify the
gh_setup provider belongs to the caller's organization.
createInsertSchema inferred scheduleType as a broadened union (drizzle-zod 0.5.1),
so passing input.scheduleType into assertHostScheduleAccess failed typecheck on a
cold build. Refine the insert schema's scheduleType to a plain z.enum and type the
helper param as the schedule enum.
Host-level schedules (server / dokploy-server) run their script as root on the
host. The owner/admin gate only ran in the no-service branch, so a member could
attach an accessible applicationId to a dokploy-server schedule and skip it,
gaining root via schedule.runManually.
Extract assertHostScheduleAccess into the schedule service and call it before
the service-access branch in create/update/delete/runManually so the host-level
authorization always applies.
- application general 'Open Terminal' now passes serviceId (applicationId).
- The docker/terminal DockerTerminalModal now forwards serviceId to its Terminal.
- compose container rows thread serviceId to their terminal + logs modals.
This lets a member with service access (but without the docker permission) open
the terminal / read logs of their own service's containers from every service
view, matching the backend service-first authorization.
When a container is opened from a service page (serviceId present), gate on
service access alone — matching application.readLogs — instead of requiring the
docker permission first. This unblocks a member who has the service but not the
canAccessToDocker permission (or the server it runs on) from reading its logs /
opening its terminal. Generic Docker-overview ops (no serviceId) still require
docker permission + server access.
- Reorder canAccessDockerOverWss: docker permission -> service access (if
serviceId) -> server access, so the service grant is the primary signal.
- Pass serviceId from the service log views (application + postgres/mysql/mariadb/
mongo/redis/libsql + compose) so container logs opened from a service page are
gated by checkServiceAccess, matching the terminal path.
Completes GHSA-qf9j service-level dimension: when a container terminal/logs/stats
is opened from a service page, the frontend now passes serviceId, and the wss
authorizer calls checkServiceAccess so a member restricted to specific services
cannot reach another service's containers. Generic Docker-overview opens have no
serviceId and keep the docker-permission + server-access gate.
Verified against the local WebSocket: a member (docker:read=false) is rejected
with close code 4003; owner is allowed.
Closes GHSA-qf9j-c9p4-r4xp
The /terminal, /docker-container-terminal, /docker-container-logs and
/docker-stats WebSocket handlers only checked session + organization, so any
authenticated member could open a root shell / read logs of any container, and
the local (serverId=local) branch reached a root SSH shell on the control-plane
host.
Adds an authorization layer (server/wss/authorize.ts):
- container ops (terminal/logs/stats): require the docker permission (owner/admin
or a member granted canAccessToDocker); for a remote server, require the server
be accessible to the caller.
- host/server terminal: the local host root terminal is restricted to owner/admin;
a remote server terminal is gated on server access.
Closes GHSA-c68r-7wg9-p7v2, GHSA-899j-cjwp-v4gw, GHSA-7r6p-v9gw-pwc8, GHSA-qf9j-c9p4-r4xp
- cluster.removeWorker: input.nodeId (z.string(), no regex) was interpolated raw
into 'docker node update/rm ${nodeId}' — now shell-quoted.
- swarm image upload (getRegistryCommands): registryTag / imageName were
interpolated raw into 'docker tag'/'docker push' and an echo. registryTag is
built from username and imagePrefix, which have no schema regex, so it was
injectable — now shell-quoted. (The docker login already used
safeDockerLoginCommand, so credentials were already safe.)
- gpu-setup: nodeId (derived from 'docker info', not user input) escaped as
defense-in-depth.
Closes GHSA-4mfc-grxw-6858, GHSA-hfwh-69ch-gv47, GHSA-prwq-2mcm-mvhr
- composePath / appName are now passed through shell-quote in createCommand,
getCreateEnvFileCommand and services/compose.ts deploy commands, instead of
being interpolated raw into 'docker compose'/'docker stack' shell commands.
- compose.command: sanitizeCommand was cosmetic (trim + strip quotes). It now
rejects shell control characters (; & | ` $ () {} <> newline), which a normal
docker compose CLI line never contains, blocking breakout into host commands.
Closes GHSA-8r5w-vqjr-8c44, GHSA-5xv2-7f8w-9j5c, GHSA-qh6h-669j-77rw
The backup and restore command builders interpolated database name / user /
password directly into a 'docker exec ... {bash,sh} -c "..."' string executed
via execAsync / execAsyncRemote. Because the values sit inside the outer shell's
double quotes, a simple quote() is insufficient: the outer shell expands $(),
backticks and $VAR before the inner quoting applies (double-nested shell).
Values are now passed to the container as environment variables (docker exec -e
VAR=<shell-quoted>) and referenced as "$VAR" inside a single-quoted inner
script, so they never enter the inner command text and cannot break out of
either shell layer. The rest of each command (pg_dump/mysqldump/etc., flags,
| gzip) is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-qc73-mp78-4833, GHSA-qf8x-98cv-92qh, GHSA-ww4j-wjrr-rq8v, GHSA-7m3w-rm5f-h4fr, GHSA-f7mp-9jfp-mjrr
The deploy functions for postgres/mysql/mariadb/mongo/redis/libsql interpolated
the user-settable dockerImage field unquoted into 'docker pull ${dockerImage}'
executed via execAsyncRemote (SSH) on the remote server path. Now passed through
shell-quote. The local path already used pullImage() (execFile-based) and is
unaffected.
Closes GHSA-6jrh-8qmg-jj3p
- dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker) -> docker pull / echo
- dockerContextPath (docker-file builder) -> cd
- publishDirectory (nixpacks builder) -> docker cp source/dest paths
These fields were interpolated unescaped into shell commands run via execAsync /
execAsyncRemote during deployment. All are now passed through shell-quote.
Registry credentials already went through safeDockerLoginCommand (unchanged).
Closes GHSA-g9cg-4mmj-mh7p, GHSA-jxxj-gmpx-h5rj, GHSA-qjrc-g63x-qhp9, GHSA-98j8-6vjr-c3xw
Simpler and consistent with the existing registry column exclusion in the same
query: drop the secret columns from the nested github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket
relations via columns:{ ...: false } instead of a post-fetch redaction helper.
Server-side clone paths re-fetch providers by id (find{Github,Gitlab,...}ById),
so deployments are unaffected. Column names are validated at compile time by
drizzle's typed columns config.
Closes GHSA-hg9j-j5mc-phf5, GHSA-wx75-vxph-2m2f
