writeTraefikConfigRemote piped the stringified YAML through echo '...' where a
single quote in any label/host/serviceName broke out (GHSA-478p). Encode it as
base64 like the other writers, and quote() every configPath used in remote
rm/cat/redirect commands (including the input.path-derived ones).
quote() the user-derived paths that reach the shell in file mounts
(mount.ts, docker getCreateFileCommand), patch repo read (repoPath/filePath),
certificate create/remove (certificatePath), and the remote scheduled command
(containerId/shellType/command/logPath), so $(), backticks and traversal in
these fields can no longer inject commands.
Add VOLUME_NAME_REGEX (Docker volume-name format) and enforce it on volumeName in
create/update/runManually — a legit volume name never contains shell metacharacters,
so this blocks injection across every docker run/rm/rclone sink at once. Escape the
user-supplied backupFileName and the mount volumeName in database rebuild with quote().
Wrap S3 credential flags (getS3Credentials + destination.testConnection), the
listBackupFiles search path, and every restore backupPath/backupFile with
shell-quote's quote() so $(), backticks, quotes and spaces in destination
fields or backupFile can no longer break out of the rclone shell commands.
Use shell-quote's quote([...]) directly at each git-provider clone call site
instead of the one-line shellWord wrapper, and remove the now-unused helper.
Behavior is identical (quote([String(v ?? '')])).
createInsertSchema inferred scheduleType as a broadened union (drizzle-zod 0.5.1),
so passing input.scheduleType into assertHostScheduleAccess failed typecheck on a
cold build. Refine the insert schema's scheduleType to a plain z.enum and type the
helper param as the schedule enum.
Host-level schedules (server / dokploy-server) run their script as root on the
host. The owner/admin gate only ran in the no-service branch, so a member could
attach an accessible applicationId to a dokploy-server schedule and skip it,
gaining root via schedule.runManually.
Extract assertHostScheduleAccess into the schedule service and call it before
the service-access branch in create/update/delete/runManually so the host-level
authorization always applies.
- cluster.removeWorker: input.nodeId (z.string(), no regex) was interpolated raw
into 'docker node update/rm ${nodeId}' — now shell-quoted.
- swarm image upload (getRegistryCommands): registryTag / imageName were
interpolated raw into 'docker tag'/'docker push' and an echo. registryTag is
built from username and imagePrefix, which have no schema regex, so it was
injectable — now shell-quoted. (The docker login already used
safeDockerLoginCommand, so credentials were already safe.)
- gpu-setup: nodeId (derived from 'docker info', not user input) escaped as
defense-in-depth.
Closes GHSA-4mfc-grxw-6858, GHSA-hfwh-69ch-gv47, GHSA-prwq-2mcm-mvhr
- composePath / appName are now passed through shell-quote in createCommand,
getCreateEnvFileCommand and services/compose.ts deploy commands, instead of
being interpolated raw into 'docker compose'/'docker stack' shell commands.
- compose.command: sanitizeCommand was cosmetic (trim + strip quotes). It now
rejects shell control characters (; & | ` $ () {} <> newline), which a normal
docker compose CLI line never contains, blocking breakout into host commands.
Closes GHSA-8r5w-vqjr-8c44, GHSA-5xv2-7f8w-9j5c, GHSA-qh6h-669j-77rw
The backup and restore command builders interpolated database name / user /
password directly into a 'docker exec ... {bash,sh} -c "..."' string executed
via execAsync / execAsyncRemote. Because the values sit inside the outer shell's
double quotes, a simple quote() is insufficient: the outer shell expands $(),
backticks and $VAR before the inner quoting applies (double-nested shell).
Values are now passed to the container as environment variables (docker exec -e
VAR=<shell-quoted>) and referenced as "$VAR" inside a single-quoted inner
script, so they never enter the inner command text and cannot break out of
either shell layer. The rest of each command (pg_dump/mysqldump/etc., flags,
| gzip) is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-qc73-mp78-4833, GHSA-qf8x-98cv-92qh, GHSA-ww4j-wjrr-rq8v, GHSA-7m3w-rm5f-h4fr, GHSA-f7mp-9jfp-mjrr
The deploy functions for postgres/mysql/mariadb/mongo/redis/libsql interpolated
the user-settable dockerImage field unquoted into 'docker pull ${dockerImage}'
executed via execAsyncRemote (SSH) on the remote server path. Now passed through
shell-quote. The local path already used pullImage() (execFile-based) and is
unaffected.
Closes GHSA-6jrh-8qmg-jj3p
- dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker) -> docker pull / echo
- dockerContextPath (docker-file builder) -> cd
- publishDirectory (nixpacks builder) -> docker cp source/dest paths
These fields were interpolated unescaped into shell commands run via execAsync /
execAsyncRemote during deployment. All are now passed through shell-quote.
Registry credentials already went through safeDockerLoginCommand (unchanged).
Closes GHSA-g9cg-4mmj-mh7p, GHSA-jxxj-gmpx-h5rj, GHSA-qjrc-g63x-qhp9, GHSA-98j8-6vjr-c3xw
Simpler and consistent with the existing registry column exclusion in the same
query: drop the secret columns from the nested github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket
relations via columns:{ ...: false } instead of a post-fetch redaction helper.
Server-side clone paths re-fetch providers by id (find{Github,Gitlab,...}ById),
so deployments are unaffected. Column names are validated at compile time by
drizzle's typed columns config.
Closes GHSA-hg9j-j5mc-phf5, GHSA-wx75-vxph-2m2f
findApplicationById eagerly loads the github/gitlab/gitea/bitbucket relations
(needed server-side to clone) including OAuth tokens, the GitHub App private key
and webhook secret. application.one returned them to the client, exposing them to
any member with service:read even when hasGitProviderAccess was false.
Adds redactApplicationGitSecrets() in the application service (blanks the secret
columns, immutably) and applies it to application.one. No client feature reads
these secrets (verified in the frontend); server-side clone paths use
findApplicationById directly, so behaviour is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-hg9j-j5mc-phf5, GHSA-wx75-vxph-2m2f
swarm.getNodes/getNodeInfo/getNodeApps/getAppInfos accepted a caller-supplied
serverId and ran remote Docker Swarm reads against it with no organization
check, exposing another tenant's swarm topology cross-org (getContainerStats
already had the check; the others did not). getNodeInfo additionally
interpolated nodeId unescaped into 'docker node inspect ${nodeId}'.
Adds an org-ownership assertion to the four unscoped handlers and passes nodeId
through shell-quote in getNodeInfo.
Closes GHSA-jj6h-388v-9rwm
findServerById eagerly loads the sshKey relation (needed for server-side SSH
operations) including the plaintext privateKey. server.one and server.remove
returned that record to the client, exposing the private key to any member
with server:read regardless of canAccessToSSHKeys.
Adds redactServerSshKey() in the server service and applies it to the server.one
and server.remove responses. No client feature consumes the private key (the SSH
key management UI uses the dedicated sshKey router), and server-side callers keep
using findServerById directly, so behaviour is unchanged.
Closes GHSA-w9cp-jqfw-4xj9
The .one / getRepositories / getBranches / testConnection handlers for
github, gitlab, gitea and bitbucket resolved a provider by bare id under
protectedProcedure and returned the full row (OAuth tokens, app private
keys, webhook secrets) with no organization or entitlement check, letting
any authenticated user read another org's git-provider credentials (IDOR).
Adds assertGitProviderAccess() in the git-provider service (rejects cross-org
with NOT_FOUND and non-entitled same-org with FORBIDDEN, reusing the existing
getAccessibleGitProviderIds entitlement logic) and calls it in every read
handler before returning secret-bearing data.
Closes GHSA-66r5-5m5f-57vg
User-controlled git fields (customGitUrl, branch names, repo owner/name,
gitlab namespace, SSH hostname) were interpolated unescaped into git clone /
ssh-keyscan shell commands run via execAsync / execAsyncRemote, allowing
authenticated OS command injection. All such values are now passed through
shell-quote before interpolation (defense at the sink, covering every code
path including the compose branch bypass).
Closes GHSA-qxcw-cx35-2hrw, GHSA-hrfh-82jj-3q46, GHSA-6693-xv3f-69px,
GHSA-qwwm-hc7m-7xp9, GHSA-grrj-6xrh-j6vp, GHSA-x2p2-qq8g-2mqq,
GHSA-cg8g-x23v-5fw8
The randomize/isolated-deployment volume transform split mount strings
on ':' and kept only the first two segments, so an access mode like
:ro, :z or :Z was silently dropped and read-only mounts became
read-write. Keep the full path+mode remainder when rebuilding the
mount string.
Fixes#4818
The @dokploy/server modules get bundled multiple times per process
(esbuild inline copy, compiled node_modules copy, and several Next.js
chunks via transpilePackages), so every module-level side effect ran
once per copy: up to 6 postgres pools, 6 dockerode clients and 6
better-auth instances in the server process, plus the repeated
'Using Docker socket' logs at boot.
- db/index.ts: use the globalThis cache in production too (one pool per process)
- constants/index.ts: cache the dockerode client on globalThis
- lib/auth.ts: wrap betterAuth() in a factory and cache the instance
- Dockerfile: exec node directly instead of leaving pnpm resident (~100MB RSS)
- Added a new service to fetch public whitelabeling configuration for unauthenticated contexts.
- Updated the whitelabeling router to utilize the new service for public requests.
- Enhanced license validation checks to ensure proper access control based on organization licenses.
- Added a check to prevent empty values from being processed in the onValueChange handler for Bitbucket, Gitea, GitHub, and GitLab providers.
- Removed unnecessary defaultValue prop from Select components to streamline the code.
- Updated button styles to remove background color for better consistency across the UI.
- Enhanced volume backup selection to display a message when no volumes are found.
This update enhances user experience by ensuring that empty selections are handled gracefully and improves the overall visual consistency of the UI components.
The Ollama detection matched any URL containing "ollama", which hides
the API Key field for Ollama Cloud (ollama.com) and drops the key from
the createOllama() client, so cloud requests go out unauthenticated.
Narrow the rule to localhost-only Ollama and forward the API key as a
Bearer header when provided.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(backup): redact S3 credentials from logs and error output (#4621)
S3 backup credentials (access key + secret) were logged in plaintext
to Dokploy service stdout via logger.info in getBackupCommand() and
console.error in keepLatestNBackups(). Any operator with access to
service logs could recover S3 credentials.
Added redactRcloneCredentials() pure function that masks
--s3-access-key-id and --s3-secret-access-key values with [REDACTED].
Applied to both the structured logger call and the error handler.
Closes#4621
* fix(backups): redact sensitive information in error logs during web server backup process
Updated error handling in the web server backup function to redact Rclone credentials from error messages before logging and notification. This change enhances security by preventing sensitive data exposure in logs.
---------
Co-authored-by: Mauricio Siu <siumauricio@icloud.com>
OpenAI strict mode for response_format requires every property to be
listed in 'required'. Optional fields must instead be modeled as
nullable so the key stays required while still allowing no value.
Fixes#4267
* fix(domain): validate hostname format to reject invalid characters
Underscores and other invalid characters were accepted in domain
inputs with no validation, causing Let's Encrypt to silently fail
certificate issuance while Dokploy fell back to a self-signed cert.
Fixes#4716
* fix(create-server): update SSH key label for clarity in server creation form
The nightly access-log-cleanup job hardcoded "dokploy-traefik" as the
container name when sending SIGUSR1. In Docker Swarm mode Traefik runs as
a service task named "dokploy-traefik.1.<task-id>", so `docker exec
dokploy-traefik` fails every night with "No such container". The log file
is rotated (inode changes) but Traefik never reopens it, leaving the
on-disk access.log frozen while real logs go to a deleted file handle.
Resolve the running container id dynamically with `docker ps --filter`,
matching the pattern already used elsewhere in the codebase, so it works
for both standalone and swarm deployments. Skip gracefully if no running
container is found.
Closes#4620
Branch names containing '#' (e.g. feat#123) were rejected by
VALID_BRANCH_REGEX when saving a git provider configuration, even
though '#' is a legal git ref character.
Add '#' to the allowed character set. The change propagates to the
backend zod schemas and all provider UI forms, since they share this
constant.
'#' is not a shell injection vector: the regex still rejects every
character needed to terminate a command (; | & $ ( ) ` newline space
quotes), and '#' only starts a shell comment at the beginning of a
word, never mid-argument as in 'git clone --branch feat#123'.
Fixes#4585
cloneGitRepository runs `ssh-keyscan <host> >> known_hosts` as one step
of a `set -e` script. Hosts whose SSH endpoint waits for the client's
identification string first — Hugging Face's hf.co among them — never
complete the keyscan handshake, so it exits 1 and `set -e` aborts the
deploy before `git clone` ever runs.
Make ssh-keyscan non-fatal and let the real ssh client record the host
key on first connect (StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new), which reaches
hosts ssh-keyscan can't scan. Same TOFU trust model, so no regression;
GitHub/GitLab/Gitea still pre-seed and verify known_hosts as before.
Remove .toLowerCase() transform from registryUsernameSchema.
AWS ECR requires the username to be exactly 'AWS' (uppercase) for
authentication. Docker Hub usernames are case-insensitive for login,
so preserving case is safe for all providers.
Closes#4632
