mirror of
https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
synced 2026-07-19 04:45:18 +02:00
f69e15afe7
Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by area: - **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path. - **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation; keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings, star/watch lists, limited/private owners). - **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions, label/attachment scoping. - **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys. ### 📌 Attention for site admins Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth a look: - **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars, OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches internal hosts, you may need to add them to `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS` settings). - **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` instead; the old key still works for now. --------- Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io> Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
43 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
43 lines
1.7 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2021 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
|
|
package migrations
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto/tls"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/hostmatcher"
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/proxy"
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/setting"
|
|
"gitea.dev/modules/util"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// migrationHTTPClient is the shared migration client. Callers that would otherwise build a client per
|
|
// request use it (via getMigrationHTTPClient) so a single connection pool is reused across downloads —
|
|
// e.g. many release assets from the same host — instead of a fresh pool and TLS handshake each time. It
|
|
// is built lazily on first use and reset by Init whenever the allow/block lists change; OnceValue keeps
|
|
// concurrent callers sharing a single client instead of racing to create their own.
|
|
var migrationHTTPClient = util.OnceValue[*http.Client]{Func: newMigrationHTTPClient}
|
|
|
|
// newMigrationHTTPClient returns a HTTP client for migration
|
|
func newMigrationHTTPClient() *http.Client {
|
|
return &http.Client{
|
|
Transport: NewMigrationHTTPTransport(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getMigrationHTTPClient returns the shared migration client, building it on first use so no request
|
|
// escapes the SSRF-validated transport even before Init has run.
|
|
func getMigrationHTTPClient() *http.Client {
|
|
return migrationHTTPClient.Value()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewMigrationHTTPTransport returns a HTTP transport for migration. The target is validated against the
|
|
// allow/block lists on both the direct-dial and proxy paths, so a configured proxy cannot be used to
|
|
// reach an otherwise-forbidden target (SSRF).
|
|
func NewMigrationHTTPTransport() *http.Transport {
|
|
return hostmatcher.NewHTTPTransport("migration", allowList, blockList, proxy.Proxy(), setting.Proxy.ProxyURLFixed,
|
|
&tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: setting.Migrations.SkipTLSVerify})
|
|
}
|