Addresses a batch of privately reported security issues, grouped by
area:
- **SSRF** - migration PR-patch/asset fetches, OAuth2 avatar & OpenID
discovery, pull-mirror URL re-validation, and the outbound proxy path.
- **Access-token scope** - prevent scope escalation on token creation;
keep public-only tokens confined (feeds, packages, Actions listings,
star/watch lists, limited/private owners).
- **Access control / disclosure** - go-get default-branch leak, webhook
authorization-header leak, watch clearing on private transitions,
label/attachment scoping.
- **Denial of service** - input bounds for npm dist-tags, Debian control
files, Arch file lists, and SSH keys.
### 📌 Attention for site admins
Not breaking - existing configs keep working - but two changes are worth
a look:
- **New SSRF protection** Outbound requests (migrations, OAuth2 avatars,
OpenID discovery, pull mirrors, proxy path) are now validated against
the allow/block host lists. If your instance legitimately reaches
internal hosts, you may need to add them to
`[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` (and the relevant `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS`
settings).
- **Deprecation** `[webhook].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST` is deprecated and will
be removed in a future release. Use `[security].ALLOWED_HOST_LIST`
instead; the old key still works for now.
---------
Co-authored-by: TheFox0x7 <thefox0x7@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: techknowlogick <techknowlogick@gitea.io>
Co-authored-by: Lunny Xiao <xiaolunwen@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang <wxiaoguang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Zettat123 <zettat123@gmail.com>
- **Locale DoS:** the `Locale` middleware passed the raw
`Accept-Language` header to `ParseAcceptLanguage`, whose guard only
counts `-` while the scanner aliases `_` to `-` — a large `_`-separated
header on an unauthenticated request burned CPU. The header is now
length-bounded before parsing.
- **Public-only token scope:** `GET /teams/{id}/repos`,
`.../repos/{org}/{repo}`, `/teams/{id}/activities/feeds`, and
`/users/{username}/orgs/{org}/permissions` still returned private
repo/activity/permission data to a public-only token. They now filter
via `TokenCanAccessRepo` / `ApplyPublicOnly` and reject non-public org
permissions.
- **Push-option visibility:** `repo.private` / `repo.template` push
options were applied to any existing repo, letting an owner/admin
silently flip visibility bypassing audit, webhooks, and notifications.
They are now honored only on push-to-create.
This PR closes remaining `public-only` token gaps in the API by making
the restriction apply consistently across repository, organization,
activity, notification, and authenticated `/api/v1/user/...` routes.
Previously, `public-only` tokens were still able to:
- receive private results from some list/search/self endpoints,
- access repository data through ID-based lookups,
- and reach several authenticated self routes that should remain
unavailable for public-only access.
This change treats `public-only` as a cross-cutting visibility boundary:
- list/search endpoints now filter private resources consistently,
- repository lookups enforce the same restriction even when addressed
indirectly,
- and self routes that inherently expose or mutate private account state
now reject `public-only` tokens.
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Generated by a coding agent with Codex 5.2
---------
Co-authored-by: silverwind <me@silverwind.io>
Co-authored-by: Claude (Opus 4.7) <noreply@anthropic.com>
