Files
dokploy/apps/dokploy/__test__/deploy/docker-build-injection.test.ts
Mauricio Siu cba0b253c7 fix(security): escape user input in docker build/pull commands
- dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker) -> docker pull / echo
- dockerContextPath (docker-file builder) -> cd
- publishDirectory (nixpacks builder) -> docker cp source/dest paths

These fields were interpolated unescaped into shell commands run via execAsync /
execAsyncRemote during deployment. All are now passed through shell-quote.
Registry credentials already went through safeDockerLoginCommand (unchanged).

Closes GHSA-g9cg-4mmj-mh7p, GHSA-jxxj-gmpx-h5rj, GHSA-qjrc-g63x-qhp9, GHSA-98j8-6vjr-c3xw
2026-07-19 21:53:55 -06:00

67 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
import { parse, quote } from "shell-quote";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Reproduces the escaping applied at the docker build/pull sinks and asserts no
// payload can break out of the command. `docker`/`cd` are replaced by `:` so the
// test exercises only the injection surface, not real docker.
const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_docker_pwned_${process.pid}`;
const runAndCheckSafe = (command: string) => {
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
try {
execSync(command, { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
} catch {
// no-op stand-ins may exit non-zero; only the marker matters.
}
const fired = existsSync(MARK);
if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
return !fired;
};
const PAYLOADS = [
"$(touch %MARK%)",
"`touch %MARK%`",
"x; touch %MARK%",
"x && touch %MARK%",
"x | touch %MARK%",
];
describe("docker build/pull command injection", () => {
it("dockerImage (buildRemoteDocker: docker pull / echo) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const dockerImage = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const command = `: pull ${quote([dockerImage])}; : echo ${quote([`Pulling ${dockerImage}`])}`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("dockerContextPath (docker-file: cd) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const dockerContextPath = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const command = `: cd ${quote([dockerContextPath])}`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("publishDirectory (nixpacks: docker cp source path) is escaped", () => {
for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
const publishDirectory = p.replace("%MARK%", MARK);
const containerId = "buildabc";
const command = `: cp ${quote([`${containerId}:/app/${publishDirectory}/.`])} /dest`;
expect(runAndCheckSafe(command)).toBe(true);
}
});
it("keeps a legitimate image / path intact as a single token", () => {
// Escaping may add backslashes (e.g. before ':'), but the shell must parse
// the result back to exactly the original single token.
expect(parse(quote(["nginx:1.27-alpine"]))).toEqual(["nginx:1.27-alpine"]);
expect(parse(quote(["registry.io/team/app:tag"]))).toEqual([
"registry.io/team/app:tag",
]);
expect(parse(quote(["dist/static"]))).toEqual(["dist/static"]);
});
});